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1 Introduction 
1.1 Cross-border gathering and use of evidence 
Nobody will deny that providing an adequate answer to crime is very 
complex. Having to deal with cross-border crime only further complicates 
things, as this requires cross-border cooperation which brings along a whole 
new series of challenges. One of those challenges is the cross-border gathering 
and use of evidence.  
In spite of the emergence of mutual recognition in criminal matters1 in 
general and more specifically the recent evolutions in the fields of evidence and 
investigative measures raise questions as to the feasibility of mutual recognition 
of investigative measures and free movement of evidence. Traces of these 
questions can also be found at European policy level. 
In 2004 the European Commission sponsored a study conducted by the 
British Law Society2 obtaining data from the bar associations in each of the 
member states concerning the national laws on gathering and handling of 
evidence. Soon after the conclusion of the study, the legal framework in the 
member states significantly changed due to two crucial developments at EU 
level. First, in 2005, the EU Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters 
(EU MLA) entered into force3. The EU MLA Convention covers MLA in general 
and supplements the existing conventions in this field. Second, in 2008, the 
Council agreed on a general approach to the framework decision on the 
European Evidence Warrant (EEW).4 This framework decision applies the MR 
principle to judicial decisions for the purpose of obtaining evidence for use in 
criminal proceedings.  In addition to this, it was the intention of the Commission 
to initiate preparatory work on a legal instrument, which would expand the 
scope of application of the EEW in order to further replace the existing regime of 
                                                             
1 In recent years, mutual recognition (MR) gained more importance. The 1999 Tampere 
Conclusions identified MR as the cornerstone of judicial co-operation. The 2001 Program of 
measures  to implement the MR principle states that the aim in this context is threefold: first to 
ensure that the evidence is admissible, second to prevent its disappearance and third to 
facilitate the enforcement of search and seizure orders, so that evidence can be quickly secured 
in a criminal case. Through MR, requests gain a mandatory character as both refusal grounds 
and the double criminality tests are largely abandoned. Initial but significant steps have been 
taken by means of adopting the freezing order  and the EEW. However, today the bulk of cross-
border cooperation on obtaining evidence is still centred around mutual legal assistance (MLA) 
techniques. A possible next step is the introduction of the MR principle in the remaining MLA 
field. 
2 THE BRITISH LAW SOCIETY (2004). Study of the laws of evidence in criminal proceedings throughout 
the European Union. Brussels, European Commission DG Justice and Home Affairs. 
3 Council of the European Union (2000). "Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union." OJ C 197 of 12.7.2000. 
4 Council of the European Union (2008). "Framework decision of 18 December 2008 on the 
European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in 
proceedings in criminal matters " OJ L 350 of 30.12.2008. 
mutual legal assistance (MLA) within the EU by the MR principle.5 In 2009, the 
European Commission awarded the Institute for International Research on 
Criminal Policy (IRCP) a contract to perform a follow up study on the laws of 
evidence.6 At the onset of the Study, the European Commission launched the 
2009 Green Paper on obtaining evidence in criminal matters from one Member state to 
another and securing its admissibility.7 
 
1.2 Over complexity of the current environment 
The existing rules on obtaining evidence in criminal matters in the EU are of 
two different kinds. First, there are instruments based on the MLA principle. 
MLA, short for mutual legal assistance, starts from the principle of requesting 
for assistance and leaving the requested member state room to assess whether or 
not to respond to that request.8 The most notable MLA instruments include the 
European Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters (ECMA)9, 
supplemented by the Schengen Agreement (SIC)10 and the Convention on 
mutual assistance in criminal matters (EU MLA)11 and its Protocol (EU MLA 
Protocol)12. Second, there are instruments based on the MR principle, of which 
the EEW is the best known. MR, short for mutual recognition, starts from the 
                                                             
5 For analyses on the topic of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters see Vermeulen, G. 
(1999). Wederzijdse rechtshulp in strafzaken in de Europese Unie: naar een volwaardige eigen 
rechtshulpruimte voor de Lid-Staten? Antwerp-Apeldoorn, Maklu..;VERMEULEN, G. (2002). 
New Developments in EU Criminal Policy with regard to Cross-Border Crime. in VAN DUYNE, 
P., VON LAMPE, K. and PASSAS, N. Upperworld and Underworld in Cross-Border Crime. Nijmegen, 
Wolf Legal Publishers: 115-140.;VERMEULEN, G. (2001). New trends in international co-operation 
in criminal matters in the European Union' in BREUR, C., KOMMER, M., NIJBOER, J. and REYNTJES, 
J. New Trends in Criminal Investigation and Evidence. Antwerp-Groningen-Oxford, Intersentia. 2: 
683-698.; VERMEULEN, G. (2000). The European Union Convention on mutual assistance in 
criminal matters. in DE KERCKHOVE, G. and WEYEMBERGH, A. Vers un espace judiciaire pénal 
européen - Towards a European Judicial Criminal Area. Brussels, Editions de l’Université de 
Bruxelles: 181-194  
6 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2008). "Call for Tender of 8 December 2008: Study on the laws of 
evidence in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union." JLS/2008/E4/006. 
7 European Commission (2009). "Green Paper on obtaining evidence in criminal matters from 
one Member State to another and securing its admissibility." COM(2009) 624 final of 11.11.2009. 
8 VERMEULEN, G. (2000). The European Union Convention on mutual assistance in criminal 
matters. in DE KERCKHOVE, G. and WEYEMBERGH, A. Vers un espace judiciaire pénal européen - 
Towards a European Judicial Criminal Area. Brussels, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles: 181-194  
9 Council of Europe (1959). "European Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters " 
ETS n°30 of 20.4.1959. 
10 "Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the 
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders." OJ L 239 
of 22.09.2000  
11 Council of the European Union (2000). "Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union." OJ C 197 of 12.7.2000. 
12 Council of the European Union (2001). "Protocol to the Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union established by the Council 
in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union." OJ C 326 of 21.11.2001. 
principle of ordering and executing leaving little or no room for appreciation in 
the executing member state.13  
A series of investigative measures is explicitly regulated in one or more of 
those MLA/MR instruments, each of them having an individual regime. Besides 
those explicitly regulated investigative measures, a significant amount of 
investigative measures is currently not regulated what can make their 
application complex and cumbersome. 
As a result, it cannot be denied that the current environment which – only 
partially – regulates investigative measures and the use of evidence lacks 
transparency. The over complexity is confusing and above all 
counterproductive.  
 
1.3 A six clustered benchmarking framework 
Considering the complexity of the current environment, a benchmarking 
framework to unravel some of the applicable regimes was developed. It does not 
only clarify the existing legal provisions, but also supports future policy making. 
To create this benchmarking framework, an in depth analysis of the existing 
legal instruments was performed to identify the explicitly regulated 
investigative measures and cluster them according to the regime applicable to 
them. Furthermore, considering the vast amount of investigative measures 
which are currently not explicitly regulated, an additional analysis was 
performed as to the likeliness member states would attach a certain regime to 
them.  
                                                             
13 See more elaborately on the principle of mutual recognition: PEERS, S. (2004). "Mutual 
recognition and criminal law in the European Union: Has the Council got it wrong?" Common 
Market Law Review 41: 5, MITSILEGAS, V. (2006). "The constitutional implications of mutual 
recognition in criminal matters in the EU." Common Market Law Review 43: 1277, NILSSON, H. G. 
(2006). "From classical judicial cooperation to mutual recognition." Revue International de Droit 
Pénal 77(1-2): 53, SATZGER, H. and ZIMMERMANN, F. (2008). From traditional models of judicial 
assistance to the principle of mutual recognition: new developments of the actual paradigm of 
the european cooperation in penal matters. in BASSIOUNI, C., MILITELLO, V. and SATZGER, H. 
European Cooperation in Penal Matters: Issues and Perspectives. Milan, CEDAM - Casa Editrice 
Dott. Antonio Milani: 337-361, VERMEULEN, G. (2008). Mutual recognition, harmonisation and 
fundamental (procedural) rights protection. in MARTIN, M. Crime, Rights and the EU. The future of 
police and judicial cooperation. Londen, JUSTICE - advancing access to justice, human rights and 
the rule of law: 89-104, MORGAN, C. (2010). The Potential of Mutual Recognition as a Leading 
Policy Principle. in FIJNAUT, C. and OUWERKERK, J. The Future of Police and Judicial Cooperation in 
the European Union. Leiden, Brill: 231-239, VERMEULEN, G. (2010). How far can we go in applying 
the principle of mutual recognition? in FIJNAUT, C. and OUWERKERK, J. The Future of Police and 
Judicial Cooperation in the European Union. Leiden, Koninklijke Brill: 241-257. 
This exercise has led to a set of six clusters, as shown on the figure below.14 
 
 
 
Whereas clusters 1 and 2 are linked to the MR regime in the EEW, clusters 3 
and 4 are linked to the MLA regime applicable to a series of explicitly regulated 
investigative measures.  
Cluster 1 reflects the EEW framework decision, which applies to objects, 
documents or data obtained under various procedural powers, including 
seizure, production or search powers. The EEW as such intends to facilitate the 
obtaining of available and well-identified objects, documents and data. To the 
extent necessary, (house) search or seizure is possible. However, such a 
distinction means not all forms of (house) search or seizure fall within the scope 
of the EEW regime. In the past there has never been a separate regime for the 
obtaining of existing objects, documents and data through (house)search or 
seizure on the on hand and documents, objects and data still to be collected via a 
more scouting (house)search or seizure on the other hand. Considering the 
implicit step forward made with regard to (house)search or seizure for available 
and well-identified objects, documents and data, it is only logical for member 
states to be willing to agree that a more scouting (house)search or seizure be 
brought under the same regime as the measure(s) falling under the scope of the 
EEW. Therefore cluster 2 only concerns two investigative measures, being 
(house) search or seizure (other than the forms included in the scope of the EEW 
and thus the scope of cluster 1). 
Whereas clusters 1 and 2 are linked to the MR regime in the EEW, clusters 3 
and 4 are linked to the MLA regime applicable to a series of explicitly regulated 
investigative measures. A scan of all MLA instruments was made in search of 
                                                             
14 This figure and the high level overview of the clustering is taken from VERMEULEN, G., DE 
BONDT, W. and VAN DAMME, Y. (2010). EU cross-border gathering and use of evidence in criminal 
matters. Towards mutual recognition of investigative measures and free movement of evidence? 
Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland, Maklu. 
the conditions linked to the execution of investigative measures. As a result of 
this scan, explicitly regulated investigative measures were grouped according to 
the possibility for the requested member state to link conditions to the execution 
of the request. Cluster 3 deals with investigative measures for which the locus 
regit actum rule applies, either in full or to a certain degree. Cluster 4 deals with 
all investigative measures the execution of which the requested/executing 
member state may under the current legal framework not make dependent on 
conditions of double criminality, (double) minimum threshold or consistency 
with national law, and for which the forum regit actum  rule applies. 
Furthermore, a series of investigative measures currently not explicitly 
regulated, was listed and divided into two further categories (clusters 5 and 6), 
according to the likeliness member states would be inclined to either or not 
attach a locus or forum regit actum rule to them, and to require or abandon double 
criminality, double threshold or consistency tests. Cluster 5 consists of measures 
which are currently not explicitly regulated by any of the MLA legal instruments 
and for which, because of their intrusive character, it is deemed unlikely that 
requested member states will execute them unless execution will be in 
accordance with or in the manner provided for in its national law or under 
conditions of double criminality, double minimum threshold or consistency with 
its national law. Cluster 6 consist of measures for which, because of their non-
intrusive character, it is likely that requested member states will allow for them 
under the most lenient MLA regime, i.e. be willing to execute them in 
compliance with the formalities and procedures expressly indicated by the 
requesting member state, provided that these are not contrary to the 
fundamental principles of its own law. 
Having unravelled the current environment and developed a series of 
working hypotheses, a questionnaire was prepared, aiming at obtaining up to 
date information on the possibility to move ahead and introduce a more MR 
based MLA. 
 
1.4 Data collection via online-questionnaire 
1.4.1 Design of the questionnaire 
Besides a set of preliminary questions on evidence related issues and a set of 
questions on the institutional capacity in the member states, the bulk of 
questions were related to the functioning of MLA and potentially MR. The 
differences brought about by the different types of cooperation and investigative 
measures were the starting point for the architecture of the questionnaire. 
Analysing on the one hand the theoretical and legal framework surrounding 
cooperation and investigative measures and on the other hand the practical 
implications and attitudes towards those forms of cooperation and investigative 
measures, a set of six different clusters of cooperation types were identified. 
Four main characteristics of MR were used as the backbone of the study and 
the backbone of the structure of this paper.  
The first MR characteristic is the use of the 32 MR offences (to abandon the 
double criminality requirement).  
The second MR characteristic relates to the enhanced stringency in 
cooperation. Introducing MR into MLA raises questions as to the feasibility of 
limiting the grounds for refusal. Linked to those grounds for refusal are the 
grounds for postponement and the impact such grounds have on the speed with 
which recognition takes place and execution is commenced. 
The third MR characteristic relates to the shift from merely requesting to a 
regime in which orders are issued.  
The fourth MR characteristic relates to the horizontalisation of cooperation. 
Assessing the legal feasibility to base the entirety of mutual assistance on MR 
characteristics, requires an assessment of the compatibility of the MR 
characteristics with the philosophy of MLA. However, at the same time it is 
important to underline that not all forms of MLA can be replaced with an MR 
regime. The functioning and specific features of a joint investigation team for 
example are fully incompatible with the ordering and executing principles of 
MR. Furthermore, replacing the entirety of MLA with an MR regime runs the 
risk of losing the flexibility offered by the MLA obligation to afford each other 
the widest possible measure of assistance. In today’s reality, a significant 
number of highly intrusive investigative measures are not explicitly regulated, 
hence the compilation of clusters 5 and 6.  Nevertheless, assistance for those 
investigative measures remains possible based on the obligation to afford each 
other the widest possible measure of assistance. Therefore, the importance of 
this article may not be underestimated. Future (MR-based) MLA instruments 
should either maintain this flexibility or regulate each and every possible 
investigative measure. 
 
 
1.4.2 Qualified respondents: (National) expert groups and Eurojust 
Following the Eurojust College Decision of 17 July 2009, the Eurojust national 
members were appointed the single points of contact for the questionnaire. It is 
important to note that the national members were not to fill out the 
questionnaire on an individual basis. Being the single point of contact, meant 
they were responsible for bringing together an expert group with the necessary 
qualifications and diverse backgrounds encompassing representatives from all 
competent centralized authorities relevant for this study, to ensure the answers 
are representative for the concerned member state as a whole.  
Furthermore, the Eurojust College’s expertise in these matters was used to 
the advantage of the study, as a separate but similar questionnaire was sent to 
the College. The questionnaire was answered in an analytical and detailed 
manner, especially in the light of EU future policy-assessments. 
The draft final report is to be presented at the European Commission Expert 
group on Evidence on 9 February 2010, to validate the research results. 
 
2 Findings and recommendations15  
2.1 MR of investigative measures 
2.1.1 The use of the 32 MR offences 
For the analysis of the first MR characteristic – the use of the 32 MR offences 
(most commonly used to abandon the double criminality requirement)16 – 
member states were asked to what extent either partial or general abandonment 
of the double criminality requirement is considered acceptable in MLA. 
Surprisingly, no less than 90% of the member states are willing to grant their 
cooperation even if the investigative measure relates to acts which do not 
constitute an offence in their own national law. This means that only 10% of the 
member states attach great value to a full fledged double criminality 
requirement. In current practice 60% of the member states do not even apply the 
double criminality requirement, even though they are allowed to do so. 
Abandoning the double criminality requirement most definitely constitutes a 
significant improvement in terms of efficient cooperation among member states. 
Furthermore, an additional 30% accept abandonment of the double criminality 
requirement as a future policy option. All of the above findings considered 
together, together with theoretical reasoning, make it acceptable to conclude that 
double criminality can and should no longer be inserted into the future legal 
framework. 
Furthermore, the questionnaire aimed at assessing the feasibility to use the 32 
MR offences beyond the double criminality framework. 
First, the requirement to execute in consistency with the national law of the 
executing member state was assessed. Because such a requirement might hinder 
efficient cooperation, it was worth investigating the willingness of member 
states to waive this right when execution is related to acts included in the 32 MR 
offences. The assessed situation concerned the execution for acts for which the 
requested measure cannot be taken or ordered in a national case according to the 
national law of the executing state. Analysis revealed that only 20% would never 
allow such execution. No less than 80% of member states are either currently 
executing or willing to accept a policy to oblige execution if the acts concerned 
are included in the 32 MR offences. 
Second, the possibility to in future instruments limit refusal and 
postponement grounds for the execution of requests was put to the test. It is 
essential to the MR philosophy that refusal and postponement grounds be 
limited as much as possible. The question again rises whether the introduction 
                                                             
15 This section is largely based on the executive summary included in the final report published 
as VERMEULEN, G., DE BONDT, W. and VAN DAMME, Y. (2010). EU cross-border gathering and use of 
evidence in criminal matters. Towards mutual recognition of investigative measures and free movement 
of evidence? Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland, Maklu. 
16 See more elaboratly on the used of the 32 MR offences in DE BONDT, W. and VERMEULEN, G. 
(2010). Appreciating Approximation. Using common offence concepts to facilitate police and 
judicial cooperation in the EU. in COOLS, M. Readings On Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & 
Policing. Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland, Maklu. 4: 15-40. 
of the 32 MR offences would have an added value in this context. Analysis 
revealed that neither for operational, nor for financial capacity issues the 
preparedness of member states to limit refusal and postponement grounds, has a 
significant link to the 32 MR offences. Operational capacity is both used as a 
ground for refusal and as a ground for postponement. Considering that 70% of 
the member states indicated not to use operational capacity as a refusal ground, 
added value via introduction of the 32 MR offences can only be generated for the 
remaining 30%. Even though 1 out of 3 up to 1 out of 2 member states accepts 
removing the possibility to refuse when acts are included in the 32 MR offences 
list, the result would be marginal as only a small number of member states 
refuses on this ground to begin with. Similarly, financial capacity as a refusal 
ground would not benefit from the introduction of the 32 MR offences. Member 
states favour a system in which a fair share of the costs/expenses would be 
borne/refunded by the requesting/issuing authority/member state over a regime 
in which execution would be obliged regardless of any form of sharing the 
financial burden 
Third, the questionnaire aimed at assessing the added value of the 32 MR 
offences in the context of admissibility of evidence. Member states were asked 
whether they would consider it to be an acceptable future policy option that 
information lawfully obtained by a member or seconded member while part of a 
joint investigation team which is not otherwise available to the competent 
authorities of the member states would constitute per se admissible evidence 
under the national law of the member states concerned. Only 10% considered 
this not to be an option. The other 90% do not require that such admissibility is 
limited to the 32 MR offences.  
Fourth and final, member states were asked whether they would consider it 
to be an acceptable future policy option that competent authorities from other 
member states who are lawfully present on their territory while executing a 
request/order/warrant  draft official reports having the same probative value as 
if they had been drafted by their own competent authorities. 80% of the member 
states consider admissibility of ‚draft official reports having the same probative 
value as if they had been drafted by own competent authorities‛ to be an 
acceptable future policy and do not require such admissibility to be limited to 
the 32 MR offences. 
To conclude, it is reasonable to accept that the introduction of the 32 MR 
offences in other areas than the abandonment of the double criminality 
requirement needs to be thoroughly considered. In some areas member states 
are willing to move ahead and accept obligations when cooperation is linked to 
any of the 32 MR offences. Additionally, member states are even willing to move 
even further, as they indicate to be willing to accept obligations for cooperation, 
even beyond the 32 MR offences. Whereas the introduction might seem a step 
forward, analysis clearly revealed that limiting such a step forward to the 32 MR 
offences can actually hinder from taking an even bigger step forward. This view 
is supported by the Eurojust College. In its replies, it is clarified that in general, 
the taking of evidence should not be dependent on whether the underlying 
offence comes under the 32 MR offences set out in previous MR instruments. 
 
2.1.2 Enhanced stringency in cooperation 
Grounds for refusal or non-execution 
Expanding the MR philosophy must in due time render traditional MLA   
more reliable and more speedy. This implies more stringency for the requested 
member state or authority, in that traditional grounds for refusal are reduced 
and requests must be replied to and effectively executed within strict deadlines. 
First, the position of member states vis-à-vis the (revised) traditional grounds 
for refusal or non-execution was tested.  
As far as the ne bis in idem principle is concerned, the vast majority of 
member states indicate that execution on the basis of ne bis in idem would be 
refused, or that it should be possible to refuse execution on the basis of it. In this 
respect it is recommendable that in future instruments the ne bis in idem principle 
should be enshrined as (at least an optional) ground for refusal or non-
execution.  
Even though wholly new and introduced in the questionnaire as a suggested 
ground for refusal or non-execution, support among member states for refusal or 
non-execution for the situation where the proceedings in the issuing member 
state relate to a person who the executing member state has granted immunity 
from prosecution for the same facts as a benefit for his or her collaboration with 
justice, is strikingly high. It is therefore recommended to introduce this newly 
suggested (optional) ground for refusal or non-execution in future (MR-based) 
MLA instruments.  
Refusal or non-execution for reason of lack of double criminality was also 
assessed.17 Granting traditional MLA generically does not depend on the 
condition of double criminality, and the possibility of refusal on the basis of lack 
of double criminality is limited to a series of coercive or potentially intrusive 
investigative measures only. Therefore this refusal ground was only assessed for 
measures for which the refusal ground has not (yet) been prohibited. Only a 
small number of member states would not (insist to have the possibility to) 
invoke lack of double criminality as a ground for non-execution. Hence, 
complete removal of double criminality as a refusal or non-execution ground is 
unwanted and unachievable. However, the potential of introducing a 
prohibition to invoke it for the 32 MR offences in these cases seems far more 
promising.  
Subsequently, impossibility to execute as a refusal ground was assessed. Art. 
13, 1, c EEW stipulates that recognition or execution of an EEW may be refused 
in the executing member state if it is not possible to execute it by any of the 
measures available to the executing authority in the specific case in accordance 
with the provisions of the EEW. This non-execution ground is EEW-specific, and 
is inexistent under current MLA instruments. Asked whether they would refuse 
                                                             
17 It has already been pointed out above that the granting of traditional MLA generically does 
not depend on the condition of double criminality, and that the possibility of refusal on the 
basis of lack of double criminality is limited to a series of coercive or potentially intrusive 
investigative measures only. Currently that is the case for search or seizure (cluster 2 and, the 
case being, cluster 1) and for the investigative measures comprised in cluster 3. 
execution of an EEW (or would want to be able to refuse it) if it is not possible to 
execute it by any of the measures which would be available to them in a similar 
domestic case the majority of member states answered affirmatively. Both for 
theoretical reasons and on the basis of the empirical research among member 
states, it is highly recommended to retain the ground for non-execution for 
measures related to the EEW (cluster 1), and stressing that it should obviously 
not be introduced for any other cluster, not even cluster 2, considering the EEW-
specificity of the refusal ground 
Furthermore, refusing execution for reasons of immunity or privilege under the 
law of the executing member state was assessed.  Surprisingly, when tested, 
there was significant support among member states for keeping or even 
introducing this ground for non-execution concerned. Article 13, 1, d EEW, as 
Article 7, 1, (b) of the 2003 Freezing Order, has explicitly introduced as a non-
execution ground the circumstance where there is an immunity or privilege 
under the law of the executing member state which makes it impossible to 
execute the EEW or respectively freezing order. It is important to stress that the 
introduction of this ground for refusal or non-execution is a step backwards, 
compared to traditional MLA, and should therefore, from an MR perspective, 
definitely not be rolled out over the entirety of MLA. On the contrary, its 
deletion is proposed even for the sphere of the EEW (cluster 1) and the freezing 
of evidence.  
The next refusal ground under assessment was the extra-territoriality 
principle.18 This refusal ground was copied in the EEW from the EAW, which 
seems a regrettable mistake as extradition and surrender law cannot be simply 
assimilated with MLA. Introduction of it in future (MR based) MLA instruments 
is therefore opposed, and deletion of it in the EEW. This stance is supported by 
the assessments made with member states.  
As for the exception ground of ordre public, and notwithstanding the 
empirical results, there is no reason for keeping the traditional ordre public 
exception in place. Traditionally, assistance may be refused if the requested 
party considers that execution of the request is likely to prejudice the sovereignty, 
security, ordre public or other essential interests of its country. However, in the EEW 
the exclusion ground has been significantly reduced in that it may only be 
invoked where, and to the extent that, the objects, documents or data would for 
those reasons neither be used as evidence in a similar domestic case.19 Through 
the latter interpretation, the traditional ordre public exception has lost the 
traditional inter-state dimension it has always had in judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. A middle course is recommended, as was introduced in the 
                                                             
18Art 13, 1, f EEW states that recognition or execution of an EEW may be refused in the 
executing state if the EEW relates to criminal offences which: (i) under the law of the executing 
state are regarded as having been committed wholly or for a major or essential part within its 
territory, or in a place equivalent to its territory; or (ii) were committed outside the territory of 
the requesting state, and the law of the executing state does not permit Legal proceedings to be 
taken in respect of such offences where they are committed outside that State’s territory. 
19 Art 13, 1, g EEW 
Wittem Convention of 197920, and to allow imposing conditions to the execution 
if this can avoid affecting the interests of the requested state.  
Also, the possibility to refuse cooperation referring to the political offence 
exception was assessed. It has for long held an important position in cooperation 
instruments. Today this position cannot be maintained any longer for two main 
raisons. First, for reasons of internal consistency in the legislative framework it is 
advised to ban the political offence exception altogether. Second it should be 
noted that calling upon the political offence exception is a clear sign of distrust 
with regard to the requesting member state, which is odd considering that 
member states have explicitly expressed confidence in the structure and 
operation of the legal systems of the other member states and confidence in the 
capacity of all the member states to ensure just legal procedures, as noted in the 
preamble to the TEU.  
Also, given that support for a continued double criminality rule in the 
clusters 1, 2, 3 and 5 is low, and that at least it can be recommended to reduce 
the relevance of that rule to other than the 32 MR offences, it seems clear that the 
fiscal offence exception, which has already been drastically reduced in scope in 
the 2001 EU MLA Protocol, has no real future any more. At least, its reduction 
along the lines of the EEW can be recommended throughout future (MR based) 
MLA between the member states. Empirical results from the questionnaire do 
not significantly challenge this recommendation. 
The potential implications in terms of operational or financial capacity for the 
executing member state in executing under a stringent MR regime investigative 
measures that currently lack an explicit regulation may be very significant. 
Therefore the choice was made to not only test the position of member states vis-
à-vis the (revised) traditional grounds for refusal or non-execution as assessed 
above but also to check the preparedness of member states to accept semi-
mandatory execution of the measures under clusters 5 en 6 irrespective of their 
potential financial and operational capacity impact. For the interception of 
telecommunications and the video conference hearing, there is a reverse 
financial cost regulation in place, which is why the choice was made to assess 
whether member states in the mean time would be willing to step away from the 
reverse financial cost regulation, or – alternatively – would be willing to accept a 
new financial regulation for considerable-cost measures.  
As for refusal for reasons of lack of financial capacity, none of the current 
MLA instruments explicitly provides for such a general refusal ground. Member 
states were asked if they felt that requests for investigative measures were often 
refused or should be able to be refused when it is felt that the implications of 
their execution in terms of financial capacity or resources is or would be 
substantial or extraordinary. Half of the member states did consider this an 
option. Member state reality clearly contrasts here with the stance of the 
Eurojust College, i.e. that MLA should not be refused solely on the basis that the 
                                                             
20 "Overeenkomst tussen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de Bondsrepubliek Duitsland 
betreffende de aanvulling en het vergemakkelijken van de toepassing van het Europees 
Verdrag betreffende uitlevering van 13 december 1957." Wittem 30.8.1979.  According to Art. III. 
2 of this Convention, MLA in the cases of Art. 2, (b) of the ECMA, is granted ‘if possible, 
imposing conditions, if this can avoid affecting the interests of the requested state’ 
execution of a request would have substantial implications as to financial 
resources. Also, member states were asked if they would be willing to execute 
the request anyway if a fair share, for example at a 50/50 rate, would be borne by 
the requesting/issuing member state. The results of the answers provided were 
spectacularly positive. The results are significant for the debate on a possible 
future policy option to introduce a 50/50 sharing of costs made in the execution 
of (MR based) MLA requests or orders, as an agreed fall-back position in case 
where the financial consequences of executing a request or order would be 
substantial or extraordinary, in that the cost involved would surpass an amount 
of e.g. 10.000 EUR (which is suggested to be copied from the 2006 MR of 
confiscations framework decision, thus introducing a consistent mirroring 
regime in the sphere of (MR based) future MLA between the member states).  
Concerning refusing execution for reasons of lack operational capacity, the 
large majority of member states indicated that irrespective of the cluster, lack of 
operational capacity would and should not count as a refusal or non-execution 
ground 
 
Strict reply and execution deadlines 
Of vital importance for the safeguarding of evidence, be it under traditional 
MLA or under MR is that requests or orders are replied to in a timely fashion 
and swiftly executed.  
The choice was made not to ask member states what deadlines they thought 
would be appropriate for replying to a request or order. On the basis of the EEW 
and other MR based instruments it could easily be set at e.g. 30 days, being the 
time limit then for agreeing to execution, refusing it or asking for postponement 
of effective execution of the request or order.  
Questioned about deadlines relating to effective execution of requests, 
irrespective of the clusters, approximately half of the member states require the 
requested/executing member state to execute the measure concerned within a 
provided deadline. It was inclined to share the stance taken by the Eurojust 
College, which is that whilst recognising that it may be difficult to set a general 
deadline for the execution of requests for the taking of evidence, such requests 
should be executed as quickly as possible, and preferably within a 60 day term, 
with a possible extension for another 30 days in case postponement would be 
requested.  
The importance that member states attribute to the possibility to postpone 
execution was tested separately. Interestingly however, a lot of the member 
states indicate they would not postpone execution, even if such execution would 
have a significant impact on routine domestic workload or other domestic 
priorities and even if such execution entails the risk of hampering the fluent 
functioning of their own criminal justice system. It is particularly encouraging to 
see that member states show this kind of willingness to cooperate. Member 
states that indicated to indeed use the possibility to postpone execution of a 
foreign order/request/warrant equally indicate that they are still willing to start 
execution within a reasonable deadline provided by the issuing/requesting 
member state, which is set at 45 to 60 days, which is only slightly longer than the 
Eurojust proposal which allows for a possible extension of 30 days in case 
postponement would be requested. 
Based upon this analysis, it is recommended that the time limit for agreeing 
to execution, refusing it or asking for postponement of effective execution of the 
request or order, be set at 30 days. Requests should be executed within a 60 day 
term, with a possible extension of 45 days in case postponement would be 
requested. 
 
2.1.3 Accepting and executing orders 
Caution is needed when looking into the feasibility of a future more MR 
based MLA. MR features are meticulously tested for their compatibility with 
MLA features. Particular attention needs to be paid to the law applicable to the 
execution. 
Introducing MR characteristics in MLA applications will cause tension with 
regard to the law applicable to the execution. Traditional MR foresees execution 
in the manner provided for by the national law of the executing member state, 
whereas traditional MLA applications require at least the taking into account of 
expressly indicated procedural requirements and formalities by the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state to ensure admissibility in future 
criminal proceedings. In sum, MR usually applies the locus regit actum rules, 
whereas MLA usually applies the forum regit actum rules. 
This section deals with the general willingness of member states to step away 
from the traditional MR locus regit actum regime and the position of member 
states with respect to consistency problems. Furthermore, compliance with 
expressly indicated formalities as requested by the issuing member state was put 
to the test. 
 
Accepting the validity of domestic judicial decisions taken in the issuing 
member state 
All MR-based instruments that so far have been designed, prevent a decision 
or measure to be executed abroad unless it has first been taken or ordered 
domestically or – mutatis mutandis – could have been taken or ordered in a 
similar or comparable domestic case, in due conformity with the national law 
and procedures of the issuing member state. Given that the very essence of the 
MR principle lays precisely in the expectation that member states will trust one 
another sufficiently to mutually recognise each other’s judicial decisions in 
criminal matters, as if they were their own, this is no more than logical. 
Consequently, the question at hand when considering to base the entirety of 
MLA between the EU member states as much as possible on a MR-based footing, 
is not whether this should happen via a warrant-like or a domestic order & 
certificate-like instrument. The only and real question is whether the EEW – 
which apparently is the only MR instrument under which the actual taking or 
existence of a domestic decision in the issuing member state must not be 
evidenced vis-à-vis the executing member state as a precondition for its 
execution by the latter – can or must serve as a model for reorienting MLA 
towards MR, if that were to be decided. The answer is negative, for the EEW 
(cluster 1) is extremely atypical in what it envisages, compared to traditional 
MLA requests (clusters 2-5). Whereas MLA essentially is a vehicle for requesting 
investigative measures or the transfer of precise objects, documents or data, the 
issuing of an EEW envisages a specific result, i.e. obtaining certain objects, 
documents or data, leaving it to the executing member state to take any 
investigative measures that it domestically may need to deploy (including, if 
necessary, search of premises and seizure) to that end. For it is not clear which 
investigative measures the executing member state will need to deploy in order 
to obtain the evidence sought, the EEW – even if categorized as a typical MR 
instrument – actually is no such instrument stricto sensu. For the bulk of MLA 
not covered by the EEW (comprised in clusters 2-5) the situation is different, in 
that it truly relates to the taking of investigative measures or to the transfer of 
objects, documents or data. It is hardly imaginable that a future EU MR-based 
system would envisage altering this situation, by allowing the issuing of e.g. 
‘find the truth’ warrants, ‘get incriminating testimony’ warrants or the like by 
the issuing member state, instead of the latter spelling out which concrete 
measures or procedural steps it seeks the execution of in the executing member 
state. Consequently, only a single question remains: should it be required from 
the issuing member state to always first order these measures or take these steps 
in accordance with its domestic law and procedures. The answer is obviously no. 
For a vast majority of measures or procedural steps, it would not even be 
possible to have them formally decided or ordered, especially in the phase of 
preliminary (police) investigations. Even where the measures concerned would 
require a formal domestic decision if they would need to be taken on the 
territory of the issuing member state itself, it would largely undo the flexibility 
that characterizes current MLA if each time the taking of the measures 
concerned would need to be formally decided domestically – and embedded in a 
formalised decision eligible for recognition by the executing member state as if it 
were its own decision.  Only to the extent that member states do not have 
sufficient trust in one another to contend themselves with self-declared 
observance potentialis by the issuing member state of its domestic law and 
procedures in issuing investigation orders or warrants, it seems acceptable to 
require the issuing member state to actually deliver proof of the taking of a 
domestic decision or the issuing of a domestic order or warrant to obtain the 
envisaged effect. Whether, even for far-reaching coercive or intrusive measures 
included in cluster 3 and – a fortiori – under cluster 5 – such distrust level is to 
be maintained when a roll-out of MR is envisaged, seems to be the only real 
question left. Therefore, member states have been asked for their position on the 
matter. The empirical results of the questionnaire are inconclusive, in that the 
positions of member states vary greatly. It is recommended to suffice with 
requiring the issuing member state to confirm or declare that the measure the 
execution of which is envisaged could be taken in a similar or comparable 
national case to promote full trust and hence allow for its execution without 
prior evidence of any formal domestic decision, order or warrant to the same 
effect in the issuing member state. 
 
Executing judicial decisions in the executing member state 
Because of the importance of admissibility of the gathered evidence in the 
requesting/issuing member state, acceptance of forum regit actum linked to the 
willingness to step away from strict locus regit actum plays an essential role. 
Member states were asked which position their own national law occupies with 
respect to the execution of a request/order warrant. For clusters 3 and 5, only 
20% of the member states indicated that their own national law plays an 
essential role and that execution is only possible where fully in accordance 
with/in the manner provided for in their national law (and procedures). For 
cluster 6 none of the member states indicated this strict locus regit actum 
requirement. 10% of the member states give their own national law a 
complementary role in that execution can only take place under specific 
condition(s) which would have to be observed in a similar national case (e.g. 
compliance with certain formalities and procedures, purpose or use limitations 
etc). This 10% does not vary over the different clusters. 
Considering the importance of admissibility of the gathered information/ 
evidence in the course of criminal proceedings in the requesting/issuing member 
state, several instruments foresee the possibility to expressly indicate that the 
requested/ordered member state in the execution of the measure, should comply 
with certain formalities and procedures (e.g. compliance with certain formalities 
and procedures, purpose or use limitations etc). Interestingly, 60% for cluster 3 
and 5 up to 70% for cluster 6 of the member states indicate to be willing to accept 
a forum regit actum regime.  
Additionally, member states were asked to indicate what the current position 
of the persons concerned by the execution of the measure is. Three scenarios 
were put to the test: first, the possibility to grant a person the national 
guarantees of the executing member state; second, the possibility to grant a 
person the best of both worlds, being the guarantees of either the executing or 
the requested member state; third, the possibility to introduce a set of commonly 
agreed upon minimum standards, which is supported by Eurojust. The results of 
the current practice with regard to these three scenarios are contrasted by a 
larger support of either of them as a future policy. Between 70 and 80% of the 
member states (depending on the clusters and on the scope of the rights that 
would be granted to the persons concerned) consider any of these three 
scenarios to be an acceptable future policy. When going into detail on the 
elaboration of common minimum rules, 90% of the member states indicated that 
this should based on/derived from the ECHR/other common fundamental rights 
texts and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, to the extent available. 
Secondly it was assessed to what extend member states are willing to go 
beyond the limits of their own legal system. This section of the questionnaire 
linked in with the possibility to require that the (execution of the) investigative 
measure is consistent with the law of the requested member state. Analysis 
revealed that member states are very reluctant to proceed with the execution of 
an investigative measure if it surpasses the national scope ratione personae. 70% 
indicated that execution would not be possible in such cases. Only 30% is 
prepared to go ahead with this investigative measure albeit this percentage 
increases with 10% in cluster 5. Member states are not willing to execute if the 
order/warrant/request relates to acts which do not constitute offences in the 
national law of the executing member state. Having anticipated this outcome, 
the questionnaire made a distinction between a general ratione materiae issue and 
an issue linked to the 32 MR offences featuring in mutual recognition 
instruments. As this list embodies the abandonment of the double criminality 
test, it is only logical for member states to be willing to cooperate if the acts 
concerned are included in 32 MR offences, regardless of criminalisation under 
the own national law. This hypothesis was confirmed by the results of the study 
in that 50% of the member states currently already apply this rule and an 
additional 30% considers it a valid future policy option to abandon the 
possibility to make execution dependant on double criminality. It is anticipated 
that similar results will show, when the 32 MR offences are attempted to be used 
to avoid lack of execution for other types of inconsistency with the national law 
of the execution member state. 
Furthermore, requested member states are not only obliged to answer to the 
request, but equally have to respect additional formal or procedural 
requirements attached by the requesting state provided that the requirements 
are not contrary to the requested member states’ fundamental principles of law. 
Considering the importance for the admissibility of evidence, it is interesting 
to note that not all member states use the possibility to request additional formal 
or procedural requirements. The percentage ranges from 50% in cluster 1 to 80% 
in cluster 6. This might indicate a great deal of trust in the legal systems of the 
executing member states. The end goal of mutual assistance is to obtain 
information/evidence to be used in the course of criminal proceedings in the 
issuing/requesting member state. Not complying with the formalities expressly 
indicated constitutes an important risk. The information/evidence gathered runs 
the risk of being inadmissible in the requesting/issuing member state. Therefore 
compliance with expressly indicated formalities is of utmost importance. 
 
2.1.4 Horizontalisation of cooperation 
The fourth MR characteristic under assessment relates to the 
horizontalisation of cooperation. MR typically takes place between the 
authorities of the member states. This characteristic can also be found in MLA. 
In general, communication via central authorities will only take place for 
transfer of persons held in custody and for the exchange of criminal records 
information21. Besides these explicit exceptions, the option to derogate from the 
rule of direct communication between authorities is foreseen in Art. 6, 2 EU 
MLA Convention, with allows for a derogation of the general rule in special 
cases, without further clarifying what constitutes a special case. It is advisable to 
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eliminate such possibility to derogate from the general rule, and only maintain 
one single exception for the transfer of persons held in custody However, direct 
communication and thus further horizontalisation of the cooperation 
environment impacts on the importance of institutional capacity at all authority 
levels within the member states.  
Direct communication and thus further horizontalisation of the cooperation 
environment impacts on the importance of institutional capacity at all authority 
levels within the member states. Further investment is vital to ensure that MLA 
becomes a well oiled machine.  The above made points explain why questions 
related to institutional capacity were included in the questionnaire. Acceptance 
of requests issued in a foreign language and technical capacity issues judicial 
authorities are confronted with were assessed.  
In a Union which counts 27 members and 23 different languages, MLA and 
MR become empty concepts when member states do not have the institutional 
capacity to make sure that all requests are understandable for all parties 
involved. Linguistic and translation facilities and staff are of undeniable 
importance. Member states were asked to what extent they had translations in 
English, French or German of their criminal code, their code of criminal 
procedure or (other) MLA and MR legislation available. The relevance of the 
previously mentioned question lies in the fact that most request for MLA are 
accompanied by the corresponding extracts from the relevant legislation, 
applying to the specific circumstances of the case. Analysis revealed that as far 
as fully translated versions of relevant legislation are concerned, the general 
situation is that they are more likely to be available in member states in English 
than in French and German. Even though this might seem like a boldly 
ambitious recommendation, it is however considered to be highly 
recommendable that in future (MR based) MLA it should be an obligation to 
accept requests/orders in English. Therefore, it is highly recommendable that all 
member states invest time, effort and resources in having at least partial 
translations of the most relevant passages of their criminal codes, their codes of 
criminal procedure or (other) MLA and MR legislation into English available.  
Going further when examining language-related issues in relation to MLA, 
the questionnaire assessed member states’ general willingness to accept requests 
and orders they receive from other member states, written in one of three 
aforementioned languages. The results of this assessment are clear; most 
requests and orders in English are accepted while requests and orders in French 
and German are not accepted by the large majority of the responding member 
states. This conclusion supports and further strengthens the recommendation to 
make acceptance of incoming requests/orders in English an obligation. 
The questionnaire also asked member states if proper translation and 
interpretation facilities were available to translate and interpret requests and 
orders from and into English, French, and/or German. English interpretation and 
translation facilities were most available in the responding member states, 
followed by German facilities.  French facilities were the least in place. 
Other non-legislative measures which could facilitate cross-border 
cooperation and which deserve analysis can be put under the term ‚technical 
capacity issues‛. Just as difficulties arise when member states receive requests or 
orders for assistance in a language they do not understand, answering to 
requests or orders without having the technical capacity to do so is problematic. 
Even though technical issues do not have any sort of legal framework in MLA 
nor MR-instruments, the importance of the issue is recognised and questions 
about technical issues included in the questionnaire. The importance of all of the 
issues assessed is that member states might refuse to comply with or answer to 
certain orders or request for measures to be taken, because they are technically 
not capable of doing so. The implicit legal basis for such refusals is the 
overarching Art. 1 ECMA states that member states are obliged to grant each 
other the widest measure possible of mutual assistance. If member states do not 
have the capacity to answer to requests or orders, it is obviously not possible for 
them to grant assistance and cross-border cooperation fails.  
To investigate the status questionis of technical capacity of member states to 
effectively process requests for MLA, a number of relevant questions there-to 
were asked in the questionnaire. More specifically, the extent to which certain 
technical and other facilitators for the fluent processing of requests and orders 
are available in responding member states was assessed.  
First, ICT equipment such as telephones, faxes, modem lines, e-mail, fast 
internet connectivity, etc. are either of high or medium-level availability to the 
responding member states. None of the member states claimed to have a low 
availability of such ICT-facilitators.  
When asked about the availability of technical means for video or telephone 
conferences including available measures for protection in such a context (such 
as audio/video distortion), there are as many member states claiming a high 
availability thereof as member states claiming a low availability of such means. 
When asked for the level of availability and quality of technical means required 
for special investigative measures such as interception, audio or video 
monitoring, etc. the large majority of member states reports only medium-level 
availability there-of. The importance of having the technical capacity to execute 
these kinds of measures is however not to be underestimated. In the last decade 
telecommunications technology has undergone considerable development, 
particularly in the field of mobile telecommunications. These are very widely 
used by offenders in the context of their criminal activities, especially in the field 
of cross-border crime.  
Furthermore, member states were asked about availability of and access to 
travel budgets for certain authorities to for example participate in joint 
investigation teams or to assist in the execution of requests abroad. Only a very 
small number of member states claims that such budgets are available, most 
member states report that such budgets are only available to a low extent. An 
important recommendation in this respect, especially considering the 
importance of successful JIT-cooperation and the need for extra impulses to 
engage in such cooperation, is that more budgets should urgently be made 
available.  
As a more general question, member states were asked about the availability 
and quality of off-line (paper and electronic versions) relevant legal 
documentation. Most member states claim a high availability and quality of such 
documentation and none if the member states reported a low availability and 
quality. As a very last question, member states were asked if the executions of 
requests were monitored for quality and speed. Again results were satisfying, as 
most member states reported that such a monitoring mechanism was indeed in 
place. 
 
2.2 Free movement of evidence 
The fact that evidence gathered in one member state is not automatically 
recognized in another member state of the EU, often poses difficulties to 
effective prosecution in cases which have a cross-border aspect. National rules of 
evidence are still perceived to be too different in matters of detail across the 
Union. This is why the question of mutual admissibility of evidence across EU-
borders deserves a special focus in the light of this topic. What was particularly 
assessed in this respect was the possibility of a future implementation of a 
system of mutual admissibility of evidence across the EU. The entire question of 
MLA in obtaining evidence becomes superfluous if in the end, the obtained 
evidence will not serve any real purpose in trial due to inadmissibility. It is now 
completely unclear what happens in the end with evidence, gathered or 
obtained on the basis of cross-border cooperation.  
The EEW does not explicitly address the issue of mutual admissibility of 
evidence, nor do other MR and MLA-instruments, but certain techniques of the 
EEW do however facilitate the final mutual admissibility of evidence. An 
example there-of is that the EEW removes the possibility for an executing 
member state to refuse to comply with certain formalities, requested by the 
issuing member state, an option that is indicated in other MLA instruments. In 
the light of investigating the extent to which broadening the scope of the EEW 
would be desired and possible for the future, detailed evidence-related 
questions were therefore included in the questionnaire.  
As a first focus point, rules on unlawfully obtained evidence in domestic 
cases in the member states were assessed. The question of availability of rules 
was asked for three types of scenario’s; rules that sanction unlawfully obtained 
evidence with absolute nullity, rules that proscribe that the unlawfulness or 
irregularity impacts upon the reliability of the information/evidence, or rules 
that state that use of the information/evidence as evidence would violate the 
right to a fair trial. The questionnaire also assessed what the consequences of the 
sanctions were for domestic cases. Furthermore, if member states had such rules 
in place at a domestic level, they were asked what the character of these rules 
was. The overall conclusion after this preliminary analysis is first that a 
multitude of scenarios is possible and that the landscape varies according to the 
member state. Also, in most member states all of these rules are governed by 
statutory law, only a small fraction of these rules imbedded are constitutionally 
embedded. This could mean that the future harmonization of rules for mutual 
admissibility of evidence would not necessarily pose major legal problems for 
the large majority of member states.  
The greatest differences exists among member states when it comes to the 
value that they attribute to unlawfully obtained evidence in further stages of the 
criminal justice process. Not only is there a great variety among member states 
as to the use of unlawfully obtained evidence in a merely national context as 
steering or supportive evidence or the complete exclusion thereof, some 
variation also exists as to the value that member states attribute to this evidence 
in a national context on the one hand, and to this evidence when it is obtained 
abroad on the other hand. While some member states attribute the exact same 
value to unlawfully obtained evidence in a national context and when it comes 
from another member state, others do show some difference in the validation of 
foreign evidence; Some member states are more strict in the validation of 
unlawfully obtained evidence in another member state, and surprisingly, 
sometimes more leniency is shown in the validation of foreign evidence. The fact 
that a significant amount of member states already does not make any difference 
in the validation of unlawfully obtained evidence as to where it was obtained, is 
certainly a sign of the possibility of future complete mutual admissibility of 
evidence, and attributing the same value to any kind of evidence, no matter 
where in the EU it was obtained. Furthermore, as nearly all member states have 
existing sets of rules of their own for attributing a certain value to unlawfully 
obtained evidence, the previously made remark of the law that must be 
respected if evidence is not to be excluded is first and foremost the national law 
of the place where the evidence is situated, poses no real challenges for the 
future of MR. As member states have sufficient rules in place to qualify the value 
of certain evidence, member states that request the obtainment and transfer of 
evidence should trust that these rules are of a high enough standard to mutually 
recognize the value that the requested member state has attributed to evidence 
that has moved across their borders. The rules governing exclusion can and 
should be those of the member state in which the evidence was obtained. This is 
an important recommendation for the future of mutual admissibility of 
evidence, and more generally for the future of mutual recognition. 
Furthermore, four types of techniques that show large differences across 
member states as to their value and the value of the evidence they bring forth 
have been assessed in the questionnaire. These large differences can be 
problematic if one wants to move in the direction of complete mutual 
admissibility of evidence and mutual recognition in general. The four techniques 
analysed are the use of a lie detection test, the use of statements of anonymous 
witnesses taken in the requested/executing member state not covered in the EU 
MLA Convention22, the technique of provocation/entrapment and the use of 
hearsay evidence. The questionnaire has addressed just how big the differences 
in admissibility are across member states, and how willing member states are to 
accept evidence that these techniques bring forth, when having been conducted 
abroad. The overall conclusion of this assessment is that most of the time, in a 
certain member state the same value is attributed to these techniques and the 
evidence that they bring forth, whether it comes from another member state or if 
it is obtained in the member state in question. This is a very positive outcome for 
the principle of MR. Even more so , sometimes more leniency is shown for  
evidence that these techniques bring forth coming from another member state, in 
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conducted by IRCP: VERMEULEN, G. (2005). EU standards in witness protection and collaboration 
with justice. Antwerp-Apeldoorn, Maklu. 
comparison with domestically obtained evidence, which is a surprising outcome 
to say the least. When however comparing the admissibility and value of the 
techniques on a domestic level across member states, as predicted, large 
differences exist. This could be problematic for the discussion of harmonization 
of procedural criminal law in the EU. 
Finally, member states’ views and current situations of mutual admissibility 
of lawfully obtained evidence were assessed. More specifically, member states 
were asked in the questionnaire to what extent they felt that, according to their 
experience, information/evidence which has been collected in another member 
state in accordance with its domestic law and procedures, being eligible for use 
as evidence under its domestic law, was often considered inadmissible or of a 
reduced probative value because of the manner in which it has been gathered? 
Most member states claimed that they did not feel this was often the case, which 
is a positive outcome for the future of MR. A smaller fraction of member states 
did however claim that this was often the case. These member states were asked 
what, in their experience, would often be the underlying reason for this 
inadmissibility or reduced probative value. 
Two very specific questions were asked in this respect. First, member states 
were asked if they would consider it an acceptable EU future policy option that 
information lawfully obtained by a member or seconded member while part of a 
joint investigation team which is not otherwise available to the competent 
authorities of the member states would constitute per se admissible evidence 
under the national law of the member states concerned? 90% of the member 
states would indeed consider this to be a good policy option. Secondly, member 
states were asked to what extent they currently accepted that competent 
authorities from other member states who are lawfully present on their territory 
in while executing a request/order/warrant (e.g. when seconded member of a 
joint investigation team operating on their territory, when present during a 
hearing or house search etc) draft official reports having the same probative 
value under their national law as if they had been drafted by their own 
competent authorities; Almost all member states currently accept this. Half of 
the ones that do not accept this, consider this to be a good future policy option. 
Only one member states would not be willing to accept this. 
In globo, as a conclusion of this assessment of the status quo in member 
states of mutual admissibility of evidence, the outcome is very positive and no 
significant issues would have to be faced if the system of per se admissibility of 
evidence were to be installed in the EU. The Eurojust College also reached this 
conclusion and considers that in principle, evidence taken abroad in an EU 
member state in conformity with the law of that state, should be admissible 
evidence in other member states, unless the way the evidence was obtained is 
contrary to their fundamental principles of law. 
 
 
3 Conclusion 
Cross-border cooperation is indispensible in the fight against cross-border 
crime. Even though many differences exist between the different criminal justice 
systems, they should not render cooperation impossible. The study has pointed 
to the unnecessary over complexity of the current environment and the counter 
productiveness the lack of transparency causes. It is clear that the investigative 
measures currently explicitly regulated, can be clustered according to the regime 
that is applicable to them. Furthermore, a series of currently not explicitly 
regulated investigative measures can also be brought into the clustering exercise.  
A lot of progress can be made. 
First, the introduction of the 32 offence list can entail a significant step 
forward. However it should be noted that member states can also be willing to 
move ahead regardless of the offence types involved. Therefore, the 32 MR 
offences should not be regarded as a magical ‚open sesame‛, because limiting all 
progress accordingly, can equally prevent from making even more progress. 
Second, the current use of ground for refusal or non-execution seem to be a 
work of copy pasting from other instruments and seems to depend on the feel of 
the day rather than the result of coherent and well considered policy making. 
There are good reasons to keep a number of grounds for refusal or non-
execution and even to introduce a new one. However, in line with the MR 
philosophy which requires these grounds should be limited to the absolute 
minimum, there are solid legal reasons to abandon most of them. 
Third, considering the importance for the safeguarding of evidence, 
cooperation requests need to be dealt with in a timely fashion. Deciding on 
cooperation should take no longer than 30 days. Subsequent execution should be 
concluded within a time span of 60 days, which can be extended with another 45 
days if a ground for postponement was brought up. 
Fourth, the validity of domestic judicial decisions should be accepted when 
the issuing member states confirms that – in accordance with its national law – 
the investigative measure can be taken in a similar national case.  
Fifth, considering that cooperation requests are ultimately intended to gather 
evidence to be used in the requesting member state, acceptance of the forum regit 
actum rule is of utmost importance. 
Sixth, the speediness direct cooperation offers, also impacts on the 
importance of institutional capacity. Both member states and the European 
Commission need to support initiatives to increase such capacity. 
Final, free movement of evidence is not as difficult as perceived. Evidence 
lawfully obtained in one member state should be accepted as evidence in all 
other member states, unless it was obtained contrary to any of the member 
state’s fundamental principles of law. 
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